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Risky Decisions in the Large and in the Small:  
Theory and Experiment 
  
 
By James C. Cox and Vjollca Sadiraj 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Much of the literature on theories of decision making under risk has emphasized differences 
between theories. One enduring theme has been the attempt to develop a distinction between 
“normative” and “descriptive” theories of choice.  Bernoulli (1738) introduced log utility because 
expected value theory was alleged to have descriptively incorrect predictions for behavior in St. 
Petersburg games. Much later, Kahnemann and Tversky (1979) introduced prospect theory 
because of the alleged descriptive failure of expected utility theory (von Neumann and 
Morgenstern 1947). 
In this essay, we adopt a different approach. Rather than emphasizing differences 
between theories of decision making under risk, we focus on their similarities ─ and on their 
common problems when viewed as “positive” (that is, testable) theories.  We examine five 
prominent theories of decision making under risk ─ expected value theory, expected utility 
theory, cumulative prospect theory, rank dependent utility theory, and dual theory of expected 
utility ─ and explain the fundamental problems inherent in all of them.   
We focus on two generic types of problems that are common to theories of risky 
decisions: (a) generalized St. Petersburg paradoxes; and (b) implications of implausible risk 
aversion. We also discuss the recent generalization of the risk aversion calibration literature, 
away from its previously exclusive focus on implications of decreasing marginal utility of money, 
to include implications of probability transformations (Cox et al. 2007). We also note that much 
recent discussion of alleged “behavioral” implications of Rabin’s (2000) concavity calibration 
proposition has not involved any credible observations of behavior, and discuss possible remedies 
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including the experiments reported in Cox et al. (2007) and other designs for experiments 
outlined below. 
 The second section in the chapter discusses “utility functionals” that represent risk 
preferences for the five representative theories of decision making under risk listed above and 
defines a general class of theories that contains all of them.  In section 3, we discuss issues that 
arise if the domain on which theories of decision making under risk aversion are defined is 
unbounded, as in the seminal papers on the expected utility theory of risk aversion by Arrow 
(1971) and Pratt (1964) and the textbook by Laffont (1989).  These prominent developments of 
the theory assume bounded utility (see, for example, Arrow 1971, p. 92 and Laffont 1989, p. 8) in 
order to avoid generalized St. Petersburg paradoxes on an unbounded domain. We demonstrate 
that this traditional assumption of bounded utility substitutes one type of problem for another 
because, on unbounded domains, bounded utility implies implausible risk aversion (as defined in 
section 3.1 below).  
Our discussion is not confined to expected utility theory. We demonstrate that, on an 
unbounded domain, all five of the prominent theories of risky decisions have arguably  
implausible implications: with unbounded utility (or “value” of “money transformation”) 
functions there are generalized St. Petersburg paradoxes and with bounded utility functions there 
are implausible aversions to risk taking.  
One possible reaction to the analysis in section 3 might be: “So what?  All empirical 
applications of risky decision theory are on bounded domains, so why should an applied 
economist care about any of this?”  The answer to this question is provided in subsequent sections 
of the chapter in which we elucidate how the analysis on an unbounded domain causes one to ask 
new questions about applications of risky decision theories on bounded domains. We explain how 
finite St. Petersburg games provide robustness tests for empirical work on risk aversion on 
bounded domains. We discuss parametric forms of money transformation (or utility) functions 
commonly used in econometric analysis of lottery choice data and calibrate implications of 
 3
parameter estimates in the literature for binary lottery preferences. These implied preferences 
over binary lotteries provide the basis for robustness tests of whether the reported parameter 
estimates can, indeed, rationalize the risk preferences of the subjects. 
Finally, we consider risk aversion patterns that are not based on parametric forms of 
money transformation functions or probability transformation functions. We summarize recent 
within-subjects experiments on the empirical validity of the postulated patterns of risk aversion 
underlying the concavity calibration literature and extensions of this literature to include 
convexity calibration of probability transformations. We also explain why some across-subjects 
experiments on concavity calibration reported in the literature do not, in fact, have any 
implications for empirical validity of calibrated patterns of small stakes risk aversion.   
 
2.  REPRESENTATIVE THEORIES OF DECISION UNDER RISK 
Let { , }n nY P  denote a lottery that pays amounts of money 1, 1[ , , ]n n nY y y y−= ⋅⋅⋅  with respective 
probabilities 1 1[ , , , ]n n nP p p p−= ⋅⋅⋅ , ,n N∈  the set of integers, and 1,j jy y −≥ 0jp ≥ , for 
1, 2, ,j n= ⋅⋅⋅ , and 
1
1
n
j
j
p
=
=∑ .  This essay is concerned with theories of preferences over such 
lotteries.  In representing the theories with utility functions, it will be useful to also define 
notation for the probabilities of all outcomes except jy : 
j
nP
− =   1 1 1 1[ , , , , , ]n n j jp p p p p− − +⋅⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ .  
We discuss expected value theory (Bernoulli 1738), expected utility theory (von 
Neumann and Morgenstern 1947), dual theory of expected utility (Yaari 1987), rank dependent 
utility theory (Quiggin 1982, 1993), and cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 
1992).  All five of these theories represent risk preferences with utility functionals that have a 
common form that is additive across states of the world (represented by the index 1,2,j n= ⋅⋅⋅ ).  
This additive form defines a class D of decision theories that contains the above five prominent 
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theories. We will review utility functionals for these five theories before stating the general 
functional form that can represent each theory’s typical functional as a special case.  
  Expected value theory represents preferences over the lotteries with a functional of the 
form 
(1) 
1
({ , })
n
EV n n j j
j
U Y P a b p y
=
= + ∑ , 0.b >  
The same EV preferences are represented when functional (1) is simplified by setting 0a =  and 
1b = .1  We will avoid some otherwise tedious repetition by using similar affine transformations 
of utility (or “money transformation”) functions, without explicit discussion, for other theories 
considered in subsequent paragraphs. 
Expected utility theory represents preferences over the lotteries with a functional that can 
be written as 
(2) 
1
({ , }) ( , )
n
EU n n j j
j
U Y P p u y w
=
= ∑  
where w  is the agent’s initial wealth. Utility functionals (1) and (2) are both linear in 
probabilities, which in the case of expected utility theory is an implication of the independence 
axiom. Functional (2) is linear in money payoffs y  only if the agent is risk neutral. Expected 
utility theory contains (at least) three models. The expected utility of terminal wealth model (Pratt 
1964, Arrow 1971) assumes that risk preferences are defined over terminal wealth, i.e. that the 
“money transformation function” (or utility function) u  takes the form ( , ) ( )EUWu y w y wϕ= + . 
The expected utility of income model commonly used in bidding theory assumes that risk 
preferences are independent of wealth, i.e. that the money transformation function takes the form 
                                                 
1 The EV theory of risk preferences has the same implications if terminal wealth rather than income is 
assumed to be the random lottery payoff in the functional in statement (1). 
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( , ) ( ).EUIu y w yϕ=
2  The expected utility of initial wealth and income model (Cox and Sadiraj 
2006) represents risk preferences with a money transformation function of the ordered pair of 
arguments ( , )y w .  This model includes as special cases the terminal wealth model in which there 
is full asset integration, the income model in which there is no asset integration, and other models 
in which there is partial asset integration.3 
 The dual theory of expected utility represents preferences over the lotteries with a 
functional of the form 
(3) 
1 1
({ , }) [ ( ) ( )]
n n n
DU n n k k j
j k j k j
U Y P f p f p y
= = = +
= − ⋅∑ ∑ ∑ . 
Functional (3) is linear in payoffs as a consequence of the dual independence axiom.  The 
transformation function f  for decumulative probabilities is strictly convex if the agent is risk 
averse.  If the agent is risk neutral then the decumulative probability transformation function f  is 
linear and hence the utility functional (3) is linear in probabilities (in that special case). 
 Rank dependent utility theory represents preferences over the lotteries with a functional 
of the form4 
(4) 
1
1 1 1
({ , }) [ ( ) ( )] ( )
j jn
RD n n k k j
j k k
U Y P q p q p yμ
−
= = =
= − ⋅∑ ∑ ∑ . 
Prospect theory transforms both probabilities and payoffs differently for losses than for 
gains.  In the original version of cumulative prospect theory, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
defined gains and losses in a straightforward way relative to zero income.  Some more recent 
versions of the theory have reintroduced the context-dependent gain/loss reference points used in 
                                                 
2 The expected utility of income model was used to develop much of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium bidding 
theory.  See, for examples:  Holt (1980), Harris and Raviv (1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981), Cox et al. 
(1982), Milgrom and Weber (1982), Matthews (1983), Maskin and Riley (1984), and Moore (1984). 
 
3 See Harrison, et al. (2007b) and Heinemann (2008) for empirical applications of partial asset integration 
models. 
4 We write the functional for rank dependent utility theory with transformation of cumulative probabilities 
in the same way as Quiggin (1982, 1993).  Some later expositions of this theory use a logically equivalent 
representation with transformation of decumulative probabilities. 
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the original version of “non-cumulative” prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  Let r  
be the possibly non-zero reference point value of money payoffs that determines which payoffs 
are “losses” ( y r< ) and which payoffs are “gains” ( y r> ). And let the lottery money payoffs 
jy  be less than r  for rj N≤ . Then risk preferences for cumulative prospect theory can be 
represented with a functional of the form  
(5) 
1
1 1 1
({ , }) [ ( ) ( )] ( )
rN j j
CP n n k k j
j k k
U Y P w p w p v y r
−
− − −
= = =
= − ⋅ −∑ ∑ ∑   
   
1 1
[ ( ) ( )] ( )
r
n n n
k k j
j N k j k j
w p w p v y r+ + +
= + = = +
+ − ⋅ −∑ ∑ ∑ .    
In utility functional (5): v−  is the value function for losses; v+  is the value function for gains;  
and w−  and w+  are the corresponding weighting functions for probabilities (or “capacities”).   
There is a discontinuity in the slope of the value function at payoff equal to the reference payoff 
r , which is “loss aversion.” 5  A strictly concave value function for gains v+  and associated S-
shaped probability weighting function w+ are commonly used in applications of prospect theory.   
 The analysis in subsequent sections will use a general form of utility functional that, with 
suitable interpretations, represents all of the above theories of decision making under risk. Let Dh  
be a probability transformation function for theory D. Let a positively monotonic function Dϕ  
denote a money transformation function for theory D . Let w  be the amount of initial wealth. Let 
D be the set of decision theories D  that represent preferences over lotteries by utility functionals 
with the form: 
(6) 
1
({ , }) ( , ) ( , )
n
j
D n n D j n D j
j
U Y P h p P y wϕ−
=
= ∑ . 
                                                 
5  Loss aversion, when defined as a discontinuity in the slope of the utility function at zero income, is 
consistent with the expected utility of income model (Cox and Sadiraj 2006).  
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The additive-across-states form of (6) defines the class D of theories we discuss.  This class 
contains all of the popular examples of theories discussed above. Many results in following 
sections apply to all theories in class D.  Discussion in subsequent sections will describe some 
instances in which specific differences between the utility functionals for distinct theories are 
relevant to the analysis of properties of the theories we examine. 
 Before proceeding to analyze the implications of functionals of form (6), it might be 
helpful to further discuss interpretations of (6) using the examples of theories D in D mentioned 
above.  In the case of expected value theory, the probability transformation function Dh  in (6), 
written as EVh , is a constant function of 
j
nP
−  and is the identity map of jp : ( , )
j
EV j n jh p P p
− =  
for all ( , )jj np P
− . The money transformation function EVϕ  is linear in y  (or in y w+ ).   
 Functional (6) is interpreted for expected utility theory as follows.  The probability 
transformation function EUh  is a constant function of  
j
nP
−  and is the identity map of jp , as a 
consequence of the independence axiom.  Interpretations of the money transformation function 
EUϕ vary across three expected utility models, as explained above. 
 The interpretation of functional (6) for the dual theory of expected utility is as follows.  
The money transformation function DUϕ  is always linear in y  (or in y w+ ) as a consequence of 
the dual independence axiom.  The probability transformation function DUh  is a composition of 
functions of k
k j
p
≥
∑  and 
1
k
k j
p
≥ +
∑  as shown in statement (3).  The probability transformation 
function is linear only if the agent is risk neutral. 
 Functional (6) is interpreted for rank dependent utility theory as follows.  The money 
transformation function RDϕ  is a constant function of w  and is increasing in y .  The probability 
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transformation function RDh  is a composition of functions of k
k j
p
≤
∑  and 
1
k
k j
p
≤ −
∑  as shown in 
statement (4).   
The interpretation of functional (6) for cumulative prospect theory is the most 
complicated one because of the various interdependent special features of that theory.  The 
money transformation function CPϕ  is a constant function of w  and increasing in y , with a 
discontinuous change in slope at y r= ; furthermore, in some versions of the theory the reference 
point income r  can be variable and context dependent. As shown in (5), the probability 
transformation function CPh  is a composition of functions of 
1
j
k
k
p
=
∑  and 
1
1
j
k
k
p
−
=
∑ , when y r< ,   
and a composition of functions of 
n
k
k j
p
=
∑  and 
1
n
k
k j
p
= +
∑ , when y r≥ .    
We now proceed to derive some implications of theories in class D  that have preferences 
over lotteries that can be represented by utility functionals with the form given by statement  (6). 
 
3. THEORY FOR UNBOUNDED DOMAIN: 
ST. PETERSBURG PARADOX OR IMPLAUSIBLE RISK AVERSION 
We here discuss theories of decision making under risk in the domain of discourse adopted in 
classic expositions of expected utility theory such as Arrow (1971) and Pratt (1964), as well as in 
advanced textbook treatments such as Laffont (1989).  In contrast to those studies, our discussion 
is not confined to expected utility theory but, instead, applies to all decision theories in class D.   
For any money transformation function Dϕ , defined on an unbounded domain, there can 
be only two exclusive cases: the function is either unbounded from above or bounded.  In this 
section we consider both of these two cases and show that all decision theories in class D have 
implausible implications. Models for theories in class D that assume unbounded money 
transformation functions are characterized by generalized St. Petersburg paradoxes. Models for 
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theories in class D that assume bounded money transformation functions are characterized by 
implausible risk aversion, as defined below. 
 
3.1 Unbounded Money Transformation Functions 
Some examples of unbounded money transformation functions are linear functions, power 
functions, and logarithmic functions. Daniel Bernoulli (1738) introduced the St. Petersburg 
paradox (as described in the next paragraph) that questioned the plausibility of expected value 
theory. Bernoulli offered log utility of money as a solution to the St. Petersburg paradox that 
preserves linearity in probabilities (and in that way anticipated subsequent development of 
expected utility theory). However, unbounded monotonic money transformation functions 
(including log functions) do not eliminate generalized St. Petersburg paradox problems for 
expected utility theory (Arrow 1971, p. 92; Samuelson 1977).  We here explain that unbounded 
money transformation functions produce similar plausibility problems for other decision theories 
in class D (see also Rieger and Wang 2006).    
The original St. Petersburg game pays 2k  when a fair coin comes up heads for the first 
time on flip k , an event with probability 1/ 2k .  The game can be represented by { , }Y P∞ ∞ = 
{2 ,1 / 2 }∞ ∞  where 
12 [ , 2 , 2 , , 2]n n−∞ = ⋅⋅⋅ ⋅⋅ ⋅  and 
11/ 2 [ ,1/ 2 ,1/ 2 , ,1/ 2]n n−∞ = ⋅⋅⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ .  Expected 
value theory evaluates this lottery according to 
1
({2 ,1 / 2 }) 2 (1 / 2 )k kEV
k
U
∞
∞ ∞
=
= × = ∞∑ . 
Bernoulli (1738) famously reported that most people stated they would be unwilling to pay more 
than a small finite amount to play this game.  A log utility of money function, offered by 
Bernoulli as an alternative to the linear utility of money function, does solve the paradox of the 
original St. Petersburg lottery because 
1
[ (2 ) (1/ 2 )] 2 (2)k k
k
n n
∞
=
× =∑  is finite.   
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It is now well known that the log utility of money function cannot solve the paradox of a 
slightly modified version of the original St. Petersburg game: pay exp( 2k ) when a fair coin 
comes up heads for the first time on flip k . The problem is not with the log function per se.  No 
unbounded money transformation function can eliminate problems of the St. Petersburg type of 
paradox for expected utility theory.  For any EUϕ  not bounded from above, define a sequence of 
payments EUX = { : }nx n N∈  such that, for all j, ( ) 2
k
EU kzϕ ≥ , where kz  equals either kx  or 
kw x+  depending on whether one is applying the expected utility of income model or the 
expected utility of terminal wealth model.6  The expected utility of a St. Petersburg game that 
pays kx  (instead of 2
k ) when a fair coin comes up heads for the first time on flip k  is infinite.  
This is shown for the expected utility of income model by 
 (7) ({ ,1 / 2 })EUIU x∞ ∞ =  ( ) ( )1 12 2
1 1
( ) 2k k kEUI k
k k
xϕ
∞ ∞
= =
≥ = ∞∑ ∑ . 
Hence an expected utility maximizer whose preferences are represented with money 
transformation function EUϕ  for amounts of income would prefer game EUX  to any certain 
amount of money, no matter how large.  Similarly, an expected utility maximizer whose 
preferences are represented with money transformation function EUϕ  of amounts of terminal  
wealth would be willing to pay any amount π  up to his entire (finite) amount of initial wealth 
w to play game EUX  since, for all wπ ≤ ,   
(8) ({ ,1 / 2 })EUWU x∞ ∞ =  ( ) ( )1 12 2
1 1
( ) 2 ( )k k kEUW k EUW
k k
w x wϕ π ϕ
∞ ∞
= =
− + ≥ = ∞ >∑ ∑ . 
                                                 
6 If there exists an inverse function 1EUϕ
−  then the sequence of payoffs 1 (2 )nn EUz ϕ
−=  provides a 
generalized St. Petersburg game with infinite expected utility. 
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The following proposition generalizes this result and demonstrates that unbounded money 
transformation functions produce similar plausibility problems for all decision theories in class 
D.   One has:    
 
Proposition 1.  Let an agent’s preferences defined on an unbounded domain be represented by 
functional (6) with an unbounded money transformation function ϕ  and a strictly positive 
probability transformation function .h   The agent will reject any finite amount of money in favor 
of  a St. Petersburg lottery  that pays , { | , ( ) 1/ (1/ 2 ,[1/ 2 ] )}
j j
k h j jx X x j N x hϕ ϕ
−
∞∈ = ∈ ≥  
when a fair coin comes up heads for the first time on flip k . 
 
Proof: Apply Lemma A.1 in appendix A.1.  
  
To illustrate Proposition 1, we report examples of generalized St. Petersburg games for some of 
the alternatives to expected utility theory in class D, including dual theory of expected utility, 
rank dependent utility theory, and cumulative prospect theory.   
First consider the dual theory of expected utility with positively monotonic and convex 
transformation f  for decumulative probabilities.  According to this theory, the St. Petersburg 
game that pays nx  if the first head appears on flip n  is evaluated by  
(9) 
, 1
1 1( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
n DU
DU DU n k k
n x X k n k n
U X x f f
∞ ∞
∈ = = +
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ ∑ ( )1
,
(2 ) (2 )
n DU
n n
n
n x X
x f f− −
∈
= −∑  
which is unbounded from above for nx  from 
1{ : , 1/[ (2 ) (2 )]}n nDU n nX x n N x f f
− −= ∈ ≥ − .   
Next, consider rank dependent utility theory with transformation function q  (for 
cumulative probabilities).  Since RDϕ  is not bounded from above, one can find a sequence of 
payments ( 1){ : , ( ) 1/ [ (1 2 ) (1 2 )}n nRD n RD nX x n N x q qϕ
− − −= ∈ ≥ − − − . The rank dependent 
utility of the St. Petersburg game that pays nx , RDn Xx ∈  if a fair coin comes up heads for the 
first time on flip n  is  
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(10) ( )
1
( 1)
1 1 1 1
1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 2 ) (1 2 )
2 2
n n
n n
RD RD RD j RD nk k
n k k n
U X x q q x q qϕ ϕ
∞ − ∞
− − −
= = = =
⎛ ⎞= − = − − −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
which is unbounded by construction of  RDX .   
Finally, consider cumulative prospect theory with reference point equal to a given 
amount of money r .  Let CPϕ
−  be the money transformation (or “value”) function for losses and 
CPϕ
+  be the money transformation function for gains.  Let w−  be the probability transformation in 
the loss domain and w+  be the probability transformation function in the gain domain. Assume 
loss aversion: a discontinuity of the slope of the value function at x r= . Define 
1
{ : , ( ) 1 / [ ( 2 ) ( 2 )]}k kCP n CP n
k n k n
X x n N x r w wϕ+ + − + −
≥ ≥ +
= ∈ − ≥ −∑ ∑ .  Without loss of generality, 
let r  be between jx  and 1jx + , for some j N∈ .  The St. Petersburg game that pays n CPx X∈  if 
a fair coin comes up heads for the first time on flip n  is evaluated by cumulative prospect theory 
as follows: 
 (11) 
1
1 1 1
1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
j i i
CP CP PT i k k
i k k
U X x r w wϕ
−
− − −
= = =
⎛ ⎞= − −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ ∑  
     
1 1
1 1( ) ( ) ( )
2 2PT n k kn j k n k n
x r w wϕ
∞ ∞ ∞
+ + +
= + = = +
⎛ ⎞
+ − −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ ∑  
Note that ( )CP CPU X  is unbounded from above since the first term on the right hand side is 
always finite whereas the second term on the right is unbounded from above by construction of  
CPX .  All of the above, of course, is also true if the reference point r  is set equal to zero; 
therefore a prospect theory agent would prefer the lottery CPX  to any finite amount of money.  
In this way, for any unbounded money transformation function one can construct a 
generalized St. Petersburg paradox for any of the five decision theories when they are defined on 
an unbounded domain. Bounded money transformation functions are immune to critique with 
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generalized St. Petersburg lotteries. We will explain, however, that on unbounded domains 
bounded money transformation functions imply implausible risk aversion, as next defined.   
Let 2 1{ , ; }y p y  denote a binary lottery that pays the larger amount 2y  with probability 
p  and the smaller amount 1y  with probability 1 p− .  We define “implausible risk aversion” for 
binary lotteries as follows.   
(I*)  Implausible risk aversion: for any z  there exists a finite L  such that the certain 
amount of money z L+  is preferred to the lottery { ,0.5; }z∞ . 
 
3.2 Bounded Money Transformation Functions 
In order to escape the behaviorally implausible implications of the generalized St. Petersburg 
paradox for any theory in class D defined on an unbounded domain, one needs to use a money 
transformation function that is bounded from above. But bounded money transformation 
functions imply implausible risk aversion, as we shall explain. We start with two illustrative 
examples using bounded, parametric money transformation functions commonly used in the 
literature. Subsequently, we present a general proposition for bounded money transformation 
functions that applies to all theories in class D. 
One of the commonly used money transformation (or utility) functions in the literature is 
the (concave transformation of the) exponential function, commonly known as CARA, defined 
as:7 
(13)        ( ) (1 e ), 0.yD y
λϕ λ−= − >  
Define (0.5) (0.5,[0.5])D Dg h≡  as the transformed probability of the higher outcome in a binary 
lottery with 0.5 probabilities of the two payoffs. For the exponential money transformation 
function in statement (13), it can be easily verified that decision theory D implies that a certain 
                                                 
7 In the context of the expected utility of terminal wealth model, utility function (13) represents constant 
absolute risk averse preferences, which is the source of the name CARA.    
 14
payoff in amount 1/(1 (0.5))Dx n g
λ−+ −  is preferred to { ,0.5; },x∞  for all x.  For example, an 
expected utility maximizing agent (for whom (0.5) 0.5g = ) with 0.29λ =  would prefer a 
certain payoff of $25 (or, in the terminology of Proposition 2, $22 $3x L+ = + ) to the lottery 
{$ ,0.5;$22}∞ .  The parameter value 0.07λ =  implies that an expected utility maximizing 
agent would prefer $32 for sure to the lottery {$ ,0.5;$22}∞ .   
Another common parametric specification in recent literature is the expo-power function 
introduced by Saha (1993).  Using the same notation as Holt and Laury (2002), the expo-power 
function is defined as  
(14) 
11( ) (1 e )
ry
D y
αϕ
α
−−= − , for 1.r <  
The expo-power functional form converges to a CARA (bounded) function in the limit as 
0r → and it converges to a power (unbounded) function in the limit as 0α → .  The power 
function is commonly known as CRRA.8 For some ( , )rα parameter values the expo-power 
function is bounded while for other parameter values it is unbounded.   
With an expo-power function and 0α ≠ , a decision theory D implies that 
1
1 11 1( ( ))
1 (0.5)
r r
D
x n
gα
− −+
−
 is preferred to { ,0.5; },x∞  for any given x. For example, an 
expected utility maximizing agent with 0.029α =  and 0.269r =  would prefer a certain payoff 
in amount $77 to the lottery {$ ,0.5;$0}∞ . 
The implied risk aversion for the above examples of money transformation functions 
would be at least as implausible with use of these parametric forms in cumulative prospect theory 
and rank dependent utility theory as in expected utility theory because in these former two 
                                                 
8 For the case of the expected utility of terminal wealth model, power function utility represents constant 
relative risk averse preferences, which is the source of the name CRRA.  
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theories the probability of the high outcome is pessimistically transformed; i.e. (0.5) 0.5Dg < .
9  
So, if models of cumulative prospect theory and rank dependent utility theory utilize the same 
bounded money transformation function as an expected utility model, then if the expected utility 
model predicts preference of a sure amount x L+  to risky lottery { ,0.5; },G x  for all G , so do 
cumulative prospect theory and rank dependent utility theory.   
These examples with commonly used parametric utility functions illustrate a general 
property of all theories in class D that admit bounded money transformation functions.10  The 
following proposition generalizes the discussion.  
 
Proposition 2.  Consider any theory D in class D defined on an unbounded domain that assumes 
a bounded money transformation function.  For any given x there exists a finite L such that 
{ ,0.5; }Dx L x+ ∞ .  
 
Proof: See appendix A.3. 
  
The import of Proposition 2 can be explicated by considering the special case in which the money 
transformation function Dϕ  has an inverse function 
1
Dϕ
− .  In that case the proof of Proposition 2 
in appendix A.3 tells us that that if ( )D y Aϕ ≤  for all y  then for any 0x > the certain amount of 
money 1( (0.5) (1 (0.5)) )D D D Dz g A g xϕ
−= + −  is preferred to a 50/50 lottery that pays x  or any 
positive amount G  no matter how large (represented as∞ ).  Clearly, L = Dz x− .   Proposition 2 
tells us that a bounded money transformation function is a sufficient condition for the implication 
of implausible risk aversion of type (I*) with decision theories in class D.  
 
                                                 
9 Tversky and Kahneman (1992, p. 300) provide the value (0.5) 0.42Dg =  (where, in our notation,  Dg  is 
the same as their probability weighting function for gains w+ ). 
10 Clearly, Proposition 2 does not apply to expected value theory and the dual theory of expected utility 
theory because their money transformation functions are (linear and hence) unbounded.   
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4. THEORY AND EXPERIMENTS FOR BOUNDED DOMAINS 
 
4.1  Does the Original St. Petersburg Paradox Have Empirical Relevance? 
There is a longstanding debate about the relevance of the original version of the St. Petersburg 
paradox for empirical economics. The claimed bite of the paradox has been based on thought 
experiments or hypothetical choice experiments in which it was reported that most people say 
they would be unwilling to pay more than a small amount of money to play a St. Petersburg game 
with infinite expected value. A traditional dismissal of the relevance of the paradox is based on 
the observation that no agent could actually offer a real St. Petersburg game for another to play 
because such an offer would necessarily involve a credible promise to pay unboundedly large 
amounts of money.  Recognition that there is a maximum affordable payment can resolve the 
paradox for expected value theory.  For example, if the maximum affordable payment is (or is 
believed by the decision maker to be) $3.3554×107 (= 25$2 ) then the original St. Petersburg 
lottery is a game that actually pays $ 2n  if 25n < , and $ 252  for 25n ≥ . The expected value of 
this game is only $26, so it would not be paradoxical if individuals stated they would be unwilling 
to pay large amounts to play the game. If the maximum affordable payment is 10$2 $1,024=  
(respectively, 9$2 $512= ) then the expected value is $11 (respectively, $10).  It would be 
affordable to tests predictions from expected value theory for the last two lotteries with 
experiments. 
 
4.2  Does the Generalized St. Petersburg Paradox Have Empirical Relevance? 
It is straightforward to construct affordable St. Petersburg lotteries for any decision theory in 
class D that assumes unbounded money transformation function. A corollary to Proposition 1 
provides a result for an affordable version of the generalized St. Petersburg game for risk 
preferences that can be represented by functional (6).   
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Corollary 1. (An affordable version of the generalized St. Petersburg Game) For any given N, 
consider a St. Petersburg lottery that pays ,n hx Xϕ∈  when a fair coin comes up heads for the 
first time on flip n , for n < N,  and pays Nx , otherwise.  Let U denote the value of functional (6) 
for this lottery.  Then the agent is indifferent between the lottery and receiving a certain amount 
1( )D Uϕ
− . 
 
Proof:  See appendix A.1. 
 
Let us see what Corollary 1 tells us about one of the commonly used unbounded money 
transformation functions in the literature, the power function. Suppose that an agent’s preferences 
are assumed to be represented by the expected utility of income model with CRRA or power 
function utility (or money transformation) function 1( ) / (1 )rEU x x rϕ
−= −  for some (0,1)r∈ .  
Then the lottery prizes can be set equal to 1 (1 )((1 )2 )n rnx r
−= − for 1n N< + , and Nx  for 
n N> . The corollary implies that the agent with power function coefficient r  would be 
indifferent between getting 1 (1 )((1 )( 1)) rr N −− +   for sure and playing this game.  Figures in the 
second column of Table 1 are constructed for generalized St. Petersburg games for different 
values of r .  Papers on several laboratory and field experiments reported power function 
(CRRA) estimates in the range 0.44 to 0.67.11  The 0.5r =  value in the table is close to the 
midpoint of these estimates.  As shown in Table 1, an expected utility of income maximizer with 
power function parameter 0.5 has a certainty equivalent (CE) equal to 9 for the affordable St. 
Petersburg lottery {Y4, 1/24} with prizes and [..., 256,256,64,16,4,1],Y∞ =  and respective 
probabilities 2 11 / 2 [..., 2 ,...2 , 2 ]n− − −∞ = . 
                                                 
11 As cited in Holt and Laury (2002, fn. 9, p.1649), CRRA estimates in the range 0.44 to 0.67 were reported 
by Campo et al. (2000), Chen and Plott (1998), Cox and Oaxaca (1996), Goeree and Holt (2004), and 
Goeree, et al. (2002, 2003).  Harrison, et al. (2007a) reports CRRA estimates within the same range using 
field experiment data. 
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For cumulative prospect theory with a value function xα  and weighting function 
1/( ) / ( (1 ) )w p p p pγ γ γ γ+ = + −  and with reference point 0 (as in Tversky and Kahneman 1992), 
consider the St. Petersburg game that pays  
(15)  
1/1
1 1 1/ 1/
(2 ) (2 )
((2 ) (1 (2 )) ) ((2 ) (1 (2 )) )
n n
n n n n nx
αγ γ
γ γ γ γ γ γ
− −
− − − −
⎡ ⎤
= −⎢ ⎥+ − + −⎣ ⎦
 
if head appears for the first time on the n-th flip for n < N, and pays Nx  if the first head appears 
on any toss 1n N≥ + .  According to cumulative prospect theory, the utility of this game is given 
by ( ( ), 2 ) 1nCP CPU v n N
− = + . Hence, the agent will be indifferent between $(N+1)1/ α  for sure 
and playing this game. Similar results hold for rank dependent utility theory. The last column of 
Table 1 shows a sequence of payments in an affordable St. Petersburg lottery for cumulative 
prospect theory models with α   and γ  parameter values reported by Camerer and Ho (1994), 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992), and Wu and Gonzales (1996).  The Wu and Gonzales parameter 
values of ( , ) (0.5,0.71)α γ =  imply that a cumulative prospect theory decision maker with zero 
reference point has a certainty equivalent of 36 for an affordable St. Petersburg lottery ({Y4, P4}) 
with prizes [...,503,503,220,96,36,4]Y∞ = . As shown in Table 1, these same parameter values 
of (0.5,0.71) used for rank dependent utility theory imply that an agent’s certainty equivalent for 
the lottery {Y4, 1/24} with prizes [...,316,316,147,71,32,5]Y∞ =  is  46.88.     
Finally, for the dual theory of expected utility we report payments involved in a 
generalized St. Petersburg game for two specifications of the function f: (a) ( ) /(2 )f p p p= −  
and (b) 2( )f p p= .  The first specification is offered by Yaari as an example that solves the 
common ratio effect paradox (Yaari 1987, p.105).  The second specification is used to 
demonstrate a rationale for using the Gini coefficient to rank income distributions (Yaari 1987, 
p.106).  Generalized versions of the St. Petersburg game involve payments 12 1n+ −  and 4n .  The 
affordable versions of the generalized St. Petersburg game are reported in the DU column in 
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Table 1.  In case (b) with 2( )f p p= , an example is provided by the sequence of payments 
DUv =  […,342,342,86,22,6,2] with expected value of 32 and dual expected utility 
( ,1 / 2 ) 6DU DUU v ∞ = . 
 
4.3  A Real Experiment with a Finite St. Petersburg Game 
An experimental design with clear relevance to evaluating the empirical applicability of expected 
value theory is to offer subjects a finite St. Petersburg bet with highest possible payoff an amount 
that is known to be affordable for payment by the experimenter. One such experiment, reported 
by Cox et al. (2007), involved offering subjects the opportunity to decide whether to pay their 
own money to play nine truncated St. Petersburg bets. One of each subject’s decisions was 
randomly selected for real money payoff. Bets were offered for N = 1,2,…,9.  Bet N had a 
maximum of N coin tosses and paid 2n  euros if the first head occurred on toss number n , 
for 1,2,... ,n N=  and paid nothing if no head occurred. The price offered to a subject for playing 
bet N was 25 euro cents lower than N euros where, of course, N euros was the expected value of 
bet N. An expected value maximizer would accept all of these bets.  The experimenter could 
credibly offer the game to the subjects because the highest possible payoff was 512 ( 92= ) euros 
for each subject. Cox et al. (2007) report that 47 percent of their subjects’ choices were to reject 
the opportunity to play the St. Petersburg bets. They use a linear mixture model (Harless and 
Camerer 1994) to estimate whether a risk neutral preference model can characterize the data.  Let 
the letter a  denote a subject’s response that she accepts the offer to play a specific St. Petersburg 
game in the experiment.  Let r  denote rejection of the offer to play the game.  The linear mixture 
model is used to address the specific question whether, for the nine St. Petersburg games offered 
to their subjects, the risk neutral response pattern ( , , , , , , , , )a a a a a a a a a  or the risk averse 
response pattern ( , , , , , , , , )r r r r r r r r r  is more consistent with the data. Let the stochastic 
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preferences with error rate ε  be specified in the following way: (a) if option Z is preferred then   
Prob(choose Z) = 1 ε− ; and (b) if option Z is not preferred then Prob(choose Z) = ε . The 
maximum likelihood point estimate of the proportion of subjects for which risk neutral 
preferences are rejected in favor of risk averse preferences is 0.49, with a Wald 90 percent 
confidence interval of (0.30, 0.67).  They conclude that 30 percent to 67 percent  of the subjects 
are not risk neutral in this experiment.   
 
4.4  Plausibility Checks on Empirical Findings with St. Petersburg Games 
Experiments with St. Petersburg games can be designed by following the logic of the discussion 
in section 4.2. Of course, as that discussion makes clear, one needs a postulated money 
transformation function and/or postulated probability transformation function to construct the 
payoffs for the experiment.  But that, in itself, does not rule out the possible empirical relevance 
of the generalized St. Petersburg game, as can be understood from the following.  If a researcher 
concludes, say, that expected utility theory with power function utility (or money transformation) 
function  ( )EU x xϕ =  can rationalize risk preferences on a finite domain of payoffs [ , ]z Z , this 
opens the question of whether the conclusion is plausible because it implies that the expected 
utility maximizing agents would accept all finite St. Petersburg bets with prizes 4nnx = , n = 1, 
2, …,N, so long as 4N Z≤ . The theory implies that the agent with power coefficient 1/2 would 
reject any sure amount of money up to $(N+1)2  in favor of playing the finite St. Petersburg 
lottery with a maximum payoff of N coin tosses that pays $4n  if the first head occurs on toss 
number n , for 1n N< + , and pays $4N  otherwise.  This experiment would be feasible to run 
for values on N  such that $4N is affordable.  It would provide an empirical check on plausibility 
of the conclusion that expected utility theory with square root power function preferences can 
rationalize the subjects’ risky decisions on domain [ , ]z Z .  For example, a finite version with N = 
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5 of this game that can be credibly tested in the laboratory is reported in Table 1.  Let 
5Y = [256,64,16,4,1] and 4 4 3 2 151 / 2 [2 , 2 , 2 , 2 , 2 ]− − − − −=  denote the finite St. Petersburg game that 
pays $1 if a coin lands “head” on the first flip, $4 if the coin lands “head” for the first time on the 
second flip, $16 if the coin lands “head” for the first time on the third flip, $64 if the coin lands 
“head” for the first time on the fourth flip, and $256 otherwise (with probability 
4
1
2
1
1 ( )n
n=
−∑ ).  
The expected value of this game is $23.5 whereas 5 5( ,1 / 2 ) 3EUIU Y = .  Hence, the expected 
utility of income model predicts that the agent will prefer getting $10 for sure to playing this 
game. The expected value model, however, predicts that the agent prefers this game to getting 
$23 for sure.  
For cumulative prospect theory, the last column of Table 1 shows a sequence of payments 
in a generalized St. Petersburg game. Only payments that are smaller than $500 are reported since 
that is reasonably affordable in an experiment.  Suppose for instance that someone has 
preferences that can be represented by cumulative prospect theory with reference point 0, 
0.71γ = , and 0.5α =  as reported by Wu and Gonzales (1996).  A finite version of the 
generalized version of the St. Petersburg game for this case that can be credibly tested in the 
laboratory is  PTv =  [503, 220, 96, 36, 4].  That is, the game pays $4 if a coin lands “head” on the 
first flip, $36 if the coin lands “head” for the first time on the second flip, $96 if the coin lands 
“head” for the first time on the third flip, $220 if the coin lands “head” for the first time on the 
fourth flip, and $503 otherwise. The expected value of this game is $68.19 whereas 
5( ,1 / 2 ) 5.1CP CPU v = . Hence, cumulative prospect theory with the above parameter 
specifications predicts that the agent will prefer getting $26 for sure to playing this game. The 
expected value model, however, predicts that the agent prefers the game to getting $68 for sure.  
Table 1 also reports examples of lotteries and predictions by rank dependent utility theory and 
dual theory of expected utility, as discussed in section 4.2.  
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 4.5  Plausibility Checks on Empirical Findings with Binary Lotteries 
Proposition 2 can provide a researcher with checks on the empirical plausibility of estimates of 
risk aversion parameters on a finite domain [ , ]z Z .  Using the notation of the proposition,  
questions that are clearly relevant to a finite domain involve payoff amounts x  and x L+  and 
G , all in the domain of interest, that imply x L+  for sure is preferred to { ,0.5; }G x .  
Implications such as these provide plausibility checks on reported parameter estimates.   
 Table 2 presents some implications of two money transformation (or utility) functions 
using parameter estimates for three experiments with small stakes lotteries reported in the 
literature. The parameter estimates are taken from Harrison and Rutström (2008, Table 8, p. 120).  
Unlike the discussion in section 3.2 above, we here examine the implications of estimated 
parametric money transformation functions only on the local domains of the data samples used in 
estimation of the parameters.  As shown at the top of Table 2, data are from experiments reported 
by Holt and Laury (2005), Hey and Orme (1994), and Harrison and Rutström (2008).  As shown 
just below the top of the table, parameter estimates from two functional forms are used: CRRA 
and expo-power (EP).  As shown at the next level in the table, estimates based on two theories are 
used: expected utility of income models (EU) and rank dependent utility models (RD).  
The entries in the first and third columns of Table 2 convey the following information.  
The third column reports parameter estimates for a rank dependent utility model with power 
functions for both the money transformation and probability transformation functions.  Data from 
the experiment reported in Holt and Laury (2005) yield the parameter estimate 0.85ρ =  for the 
money transformation function and the parameter estimate 1.46γ =  for the probability 
transformation function. With these parameters, the rank dependent utility model implies that 
$0.40 for sure (in column 3) is preferred to the lottery {$77,0.5;$0} (in column 1). It seems to us 
likely that almost all people would have risk preferences that are inconsistent with this prediction 
 23
and, in that sense, that the estimated parametric utility function is implausible. Importantly, the 
prediction that $0.40 for sure is preferred to {$77, 0.5; $0} is clearly testable and, therefore, a 
conclusion about plausibility or implausibility of the estimated model can be based on data not 
mere opinion.   
Estimation of the CRRA parameter using the expected utility of income model and data 
from Holt and Laury (2005) yields 0.76.r =  With this parameter, as reported in  the second 
column of Table 2,  $4.30 for sure is preferred to the lottery {$77,0.5;$0} .  The fourth and fifth 
columns of Table 2 report parameter estimates for the expo-power (EP) money transformation 
function. The parameter estimates imply that $8.60 for sure is preferred to the lottery 
{$77,0.5;$0}  for the rank dependent utility model. The preferred sure amount of money is 
$15.80 in case of the expected utility of income model. 
Table 2 uses point estimates of parameters from three data sets and four combinations of 
money transformation and probability transformation functions to derive implied preferences for 
sure amounts of money (in all columns except the first) over binary lotteries (in the first column).  
All of these implied preferences are stated on domains that are the same or smaller than those for 
the data samples.  Furthermore, all of these implied preferences are testable with real, affordable 
experiments. Conducting such tests would provide data to inform researchers’ decisions about 
whether the estimated parametric forms provide plausible or implausible characterizations of the 
risk attitudes of the subjects in experiments.  Finally, similar experiments can be designed with 
binary lotteries based on any parameter estimates within the 90% confidence limits of the 
estimation if a researcher wants to thoroughly explore the plausibility question. 
 In preceding sections, we have explored testable implications for empirical plausibility 
of  parametric forms of decision theories in class D.  Some recent studies have identified patterns 
of risk aversion, known as calibration patterns, that can be used to test plausibility of theories 
under risk without any parametric specifications. Concavity calibrations involve certain types of 
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patterns of choices that target decision theories under risk that assume concave money 
transformation (or utility) functions (Rabin 2001, Neilson 2004, Cox and Sadiraj 2006, 
Rubinstein 2006).  Convexity calibrations, on the other hand, involve patterns of risk aversion that 
apply to theories that represent risk aversion with probability transformation functions (Cox, et al. 
2007).  The following three sections summarize what is currently known about the empirical 
validity of patterns of risk aversion underlying calibration propositions. 
 
4.6. Do Concavity Calibrations of Payoff Transformation (or Utility) Functions Have Empirical 
Relevance?   
Cox et al. (2007) report an experiment  run in Calcutta, India to test the empirical validity of a 
postulated pattern of small stakes risk aversion that has implications for cumulative prospect 
theory, rank dependent utility theory, and all three expected utility models discussed in Cox and 
Sadiraj (2006), the expected utility of terminal wealth model, the expected utility of income 
model, and the expected utility of initial wealth and income model.   
Subjects in the Calcutta experiment were asked to choose between a certain amount of 
money, x  rupees (option B) and a binary lottery that paid x − 20 rupees or  x + 30 rupees with 
equal probability (option A) for values of x  from a finite set Ω .  Subjects were informed that 
one of their decisions would be randomly selected for payoff. The amount at risk in the lotteries 
(50 rupees) was about a full day’s pay for the subjects in the experiment.  By Proposition 1 in 
Cox et al. (2007), if a subject chooses option B for at least four sequential values of x  then 
calibration of the revealed pattern of small stakes risk aversion implies behaviorally implausible 
large stakes risk aversion. They call any choice pattern that meets this criterion a “concavity 
calibration pattern” and test a null hypothesis that the data are not characterized by concavity 
calibration patterns against an alternative that includes them. To conduct the test, Cox et al. 
(2007) applied a linear mixture model similar to that described in section 4.3. The reported point 
estimate for the proportion of the subjects in the Calcutta experiment that made choices for which 
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expected utility theory, rank dependent utility theory, cumulative prospect theory (with 0 
reference point payoff) imply implausible large stakes risk aversion was 0.495, with Wald 90 
percent confidence interval of (0.289, 0.702). They conclude that 29 percent to 70 percent of  the 
subjects made choices that, according to three theories of risky decision making, can be calibrated 
to imply implausible large stakes risk aversion.  According to Proposition 2 in Cox et al. (2007), 
this conclusion applies to all theories in class D that represent risk preferences with concave 
transformations of payoffs. Thus the conclusion applies to all expected utility models regardless 
of whether they specify full asset integration (the terminal wealth model), no asset integration 
(the income model), or partial asset integration (variants of the initial wealth and income model). 
Prospect theory can be immunized to concavity calibration critique by introducing 
variable reference points set equal to the x  values in the Calcutta experiments (Wakker 2005).  
The variable reference points do not, however, immunize prospect theory to other tests with data 
from the experiment because they imply that a subject will make the same choice (of the lottery 
or the certain payoff), for all values the sure payoff x .  Cox et al. report that the likelihood ratio 
test rejects this “non-switching hypothesis” in favor of an alternative that allows for one switch at 
5 percent significance level. Adding possible choice patterns with more than one switch to the 
alternative hypothesis would also lead to rejection of the non-switching hypothesis. Hence, 
variable reference points do not rescue cumulative prospect theory from inconsistency with the 
data from the experiment.    
 
4.7  Do Convexity Calibrations of Probability Transformation Functions Have Empirical 
Relevance? 
Cox et al. (2007) demonstrate that the problem of possibly implausible implications from theories 
of decision making under risk is more generic than implausible (implications of) decreasing 
marginal utility of money by extending the calibration literature in their Proposition 2 to include 
the implications of convex transformations of decumulative probabilities used to model risk 
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aversion in the dual theory.  They report another experiment run in Magdeburg, Germany in 
which subjects were asked to make nine choices between pairs of lotteries. Subjects were 
informed that one of their decisions would be randomly selected for payoff.  Decision task i , for 
1, 2,...,9i = , presented a choice between lottery A that paid €40 with probability /10i and €0 
with probability 1 /10i−  and lottery B that paid €40 with probability ( 1) /10i − , €10 with 
probability 2 /10 , and €0 with probability 1 [( 1 2) /10]i− − + .  By Proposition 2 in Cox et al. 
(2007), if a subject chooses lottery B for at least seven sequential values of the probability index 
i  then calibration of the revealed pattern of small stakes risk aversion implies implausible large 
stakes risk aversion for the dual theory.  They call any choice pattern that meets this criterion a 
“convexity calibration pattern” and test the null hypothesis that the data are not characterized by 
convexity calibration patterns against an alternative that includes them.  Again applying a linear 
mixture model, Cox et al. (2007) report that the linear mixture model yields a point estimate of 
0.81 and Wald 90 percent confidence interval of (0.66, 0.95) for the proportion of subjects for 
which the  dual theory implies implausible risk aversion. Thus the data are consistent with the 
conclusion that 66 percent to 95 percent of the subjects made choices that, according to the dual 
theory, can be calibrated to imply implausible large stakes risk aversion. 
 
4.8  Is the Expected Utility of Terminal Wealth Model More (or Less) Vulnerable to Calibration 
Critique than Other Theories?  
Rabin (2000) initiated recent literature on the large stakes risk aversion implications implied by 
calibration of postulated patterns of small stakes risk aversion.  His analysis is based on the 
supposition that an agent will reject a small stakes gamble with equal probabilities of 50% of 
winning or losing relatively small amounts, and that the agent will do this at all initial wealth 
levels in some large interval.  For example, Rabin demonstrated that if an agent would reject a 
50/50 bet in which she would lose $100 or gain $110 at all initial wealth levels up to $300,000 
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then the expected utility of terminal wealth model implies that, at an initial wealth level of 
$290,000, that agent would also reject a 50/50 bet in which she would lose $6,000 or gain $180 
million.    
Rabin (2000) and Rabin and Thaler (2001) stated strong conclusions about implausible 
risk aversion implications for expected utility theory implied by their supposed patterns of small 
stakes risk aversion but reported no experiments supporting the empirical validity of the 
suppositions. Their conclusions about expected utility theory were taken quite seriously by some 
scholars (Kahneman 2003, Camerer and Thaler 2003) and by a Nobel Prize committee (Royal 
Swedish Academy of Sciences 2002, p. 16), despite the complete absence of data consistent with 
the supposed patterns of small stakes risk aversion underlying the concavity calibrations.  It is 
ironic that, in this heyday of behavioral economics, strong conclusions about the behavioral 
plausibility of theory could be drawn without any actual observations of behavior.   
As explained by Cox and Sadiraj (2006), observations of behavior consistent with the 
pattern of risk aversion supposed in Rabin’s concavity calibration would have limited 
implications for risky decision theory because they would have no implications for expected 
utility models other than the terminal wealth model nor for other theories in class D in which 
income rather than terminal wealth is postulated as the argument of functional (6).  Furthermore, 
an experiment that could provide empirical support for Rabin’s supposition would have to be 
conducted with a within-subjects design, as we shall explain after first explaining problems with 
across-subjects experiments in the literature.  
Barberis et al. (2003) report an across-subjects, hypothetical experiment with a 50/50 lose 
$500 or gain $550 bet using as subjects MBA students, financial advisers, investment officers, 
and investor clients. They report that about half of the subjects stated they would be unwilling to 
accept the bet. They do not report wealth data for these subjects nor the relationship, if any, 
between subjects’ decisions and their wealth levels; therefore the relation between the subjects’ 
decisions and the supposed pattern of risk aversion used in concavity calibration propositions is 
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unknown. Barberis et al. (2003) also report an across-subjects, real experiment with a 50/50 lose 
$100 or gain $110 bet using MBA students as subjects. They report that only 10 percent of the 
subjects were willing to play the bet.  No wealth data are reported for these subjects either. 
It is straightforward to show that any across-subjects experiment involving one choice 
per subject cannot provide data that would support the conclusion of implausible risk aversion. 
Suppose one has a sample from an experiment (like the two Barberis et al. 2003 experiments) in 
which each of N subjects is asked to make one decision about accepting or rejecting a 50/50 lose 
$100 or gain $110 bet. Suppose that the initial wealth level of every subject is observed and that 
these wealth levels vary across a large range, say from a low of $100 to a high of $300,000. 
Would such a data sample provide support for any conclusion about the expected utility of 
terminal wealth model?  Without making other assumptions about preferences, the answer is 
clearly “no” as we next explain. 
Suppose that we observe individual wealth levels [100,300 ]jw K∈ , j = 1, 2, … , N , 
for each of N  individuals and that every one of them rejects the 50/50 lose $100, gain $110 bet.  
Can they all be expected utility of terminal wealth maximizers with globally plausible risk 
aversion?  Yes, and the following equation can be used to generate N utility functions with 
parameters ja  and jr , each of which implies indifference between accepting and rejecting the bet 
at the observed individual wealth levels:   
(16)  
100 1102 1 1
j jr r
j j j jw a w a
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
= − + +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
, 100j ja w≤ −  
Any ordered pair of parameters ( ( ), ( ))j ja w r w  below the graph of the level set of this equation 
can be used to construct a utility function  
(17)  ( )( ) ( ( ) ) jr wj j j ju w y a w w y+ = − + +  
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that implies rejection of the bet for an expected utility of terminal wealth maximizer with initial 
wealth jw  and money transformation function given by (17).  But each of these utility functions 
exhibits plausible risk aversion globally. Therefore, the empirical relevance of Rabin’s concavity 
calibration for the expected utility of terminal wealth model cannot be tested with an across-
subjects experiment.   
 The empirical validity of Rabin’s concavity calibration for the expected utility of terminal 
wealth model could, however, be tested with a within-subjects experiment.  Let subject j  have 
initial wealth jw  at the beginning of the experiment.  In round t  of the experiment, give subject 
j  an amount of money tx  and an opportunity to play a 50/50 bet with loss of 100 or gain of 110.  
Choose the set X  of values for tx  so that there are enough observations covering a sufficiently 
large range that concavity calibration can bite. An example of suitable specifications of the set 
X are provided by the sets of certain income payoffs used in the Calcutta experiment reported in 
Cox et al. (2007) and summarized above.   Consider the set of certain payoff x  values used in the 
Calcutta experiment; define { }100,  1 , 2 ,  4 ,  5 ,  6X K K K K K=  and let tx  denote the value in 
position t  in this set.  Using subject j ’s (observed) initial wealth tw  at the beginning of the 
experiment, and the controlled values tx , t = 1, 2, …, 6, define subject j ’s variable initial 
wealth level during the experiment as jt j tw xω = + .  At round t  in the experiment, give the 
subject tx  and then ask her whether she wants to accept the 50/50 gamble with loss amount 100 
and gain amount 110.  If the answer is “no” for at least four sequential values of x  then 
Proposition 1 in Cox et al. (2007) or Rabin’s (2000) concavity calibration proposition imply 
implausible risk aversion for the expected utility of terminal wealth model. Therefore this type of 
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“pay-x-in-advance,” within-subjects experiment could support, or fail to support, the empirical 
relevance of Rabin’s concavity calibration supposition for the terminal wealth model.12   
 
5.  SUMMARY IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORIES OF RISKY DECISIONS 
Some implications for theories of decision making under risk are straightforward while others are 
nuanced.  
 
5.1  Decision Theories on Unbounded Domain Have Implausible Implications 
One implication is that all theories in class D have the same problems with respect to the 
plausibility of modeling decisions under risk on an unbounded domain. This conclusion follows 
from the  demonstration that, on an unbounded domain, theories in class D are characterized by 
either the generalized St. Petersburg paradox or implausible aversion to risk of type (I*). This 
raises doubts about the plausibility of classic developments of expected utility theory for risky 
decisions (Pratt 1964, Arrow 1971).  But this plausibility critique of the theory is not confined to 
expected utility theory; instead, it applies to all theories in a class that contains cumulative 
prospect theory, rank dependent utility theory, and dual theory of expected utility (as well as 
expected utility theory).  In this sense, the fundamental problems shared by these theories may be 
more significant than their much-touted differences.   
 
5.2  Implications for Theory and its Applications on Bounded Domains 
Theories of risky decisions defined on bounded domains can be characterized by the generalized 
St. Petersburg paradox or by implausible large stakes risk aversion or by neither problem.  
                                                 
12 In contrast, this type of experiment could not produce data that would have a calibration-pattern 
implication for any of the other models discussed above for which income, not terminal wealth is the 
argument of the utility functional (Cox and Sadiraj 2006).  However, this type of experiment would have a 
testable implication for all other models in class D: (a) always choose the risky option with EV theory; or 
(b) always choose the same option with other theories.   
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Conclusions for theory on bounded domains are more nuanced, and more complicated, but they 
are empirically testable.  
Concavity calibration of postulated patterns of risk aversion have implausible large stakes 
risk aversion implications for all theories in class D that incorporate decreasing marginal utility 
of money except for specific versions of prospect theory that postulate variable reference points 
(which are rejected by testing the data). Implausible implications for theory following from 
calibrating postulated patterns of risk aversion are not confined to theories with decreasing 
marginal utility of money. The dual theory of expected utility, characterized by constant marginal 
utility of money, can be critiqued with convexity calibration of the probability transformation that 
exclusively incorporates risk aversion into this theory.  
 Whether or not critiques with the generalized St. Petersburg paradox or (calibrated) 
implausible large stakes risk aversion have bite for theories defined on bounded domains are 
empirical questions. The reason for this is apparent: people may accept feasible St. Petersburg 
bets and/or they may not reject the small stakes bets postulated in calibrations.  If both those 
outcomes were observed, the St. Petersburg paradox and calibration critiques would have no 
implication of implausible theory for bounded domains. To date, the empirical evidence is 
limited.   
As discussed above, even on very large bounded domains, expected values for St. 
Petersburg bets are quite small, on the order of $25, which (for what it’s worth) is consistent with 
commonly reported subjects’ statements about willingness to pay to play the bets in hypothetical 
experiments.  In one real payoff experiment with finite St. Petersburg bets reported by Cox et al. 
(2007), 30 percent to 67 percent of the subjects revealed risk preferences that were inconsistent 
with the expected value model.   
There is not yet any existing study that supports the conclusion that terminal wealth 
models are more vulnerable to calibration critique than income models. There are various 
misstatements in the literature about the existence of data supporting Rabin’s (2000) supposition 
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that an agent will reject a given small stakes bet at all initial wealth levels in a wide interval.  In 
fact, there is no test of Rabin’s supposition in the literature. Furthermore, a test of this supposition 
would, in any case, have no implications for models in which income rather than terminal wealth 
is the argument of utility functionals (Cox and Sadiraj 2006).   
 The within-subjects Calcutta experiment with concavity calibration reported by Cox et al. 
(2007) has implications for all three expected utility models, rank dependent utility theory, and 
the original version of cumulative prospect theory with constant reference point equal to zero 
income (Tversky and Kahneman 1992).  This was a within-subjects, real payoff experiment.  In 
the Calcutta experiment, 25 percent to 62 percent of the subjects made patterns of small stakes 
risky choices for which expected utility theory, rank dependent utility theory, and prospect theory 
(with zero reference point payoff) imply implausible large stakes risk aversion. Variable 
reference points can be incorporated into prospect theory in ways that immunize the theory to 
concavity calibration critique with this experimental design. But the testable implication of this 
version of prospect theory has a high rate of inconsistency with data from the Calcutta experiment 
and is rejected in favor of the “calibration pattern” by a likelihood ratio test.   
The Madgeburg experiment with convexity calibration for probability transformations 
(Cox et al. 2007) has implications for the dual theory of expected utility that has constant 
marginal utility of money and incorporates risk aversion solely through non-linear transformation 
of probabilities. In this experiment, 66 percent to 95 percent  of the subjects made patterns of 
risky choices for which the dual theory of expected utility implies implausible large stakes risk 
aversion.  
We conclude that, together, the Calcutta concavity calibration experiment and Magdeburg 
convexity calibration experiment provide data that suggest skepticism about the plausibility of 
popular theories of decision making for risky environments. However, more experiments and 
larger samples are needed to arrive at definitive conclusions about the empirical relevance of the 
calibration propositions. One thing that is clear is that the traditional focus on decreasing 
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marginal utility of money as the source of implausible implications from calibration of postulated 
patterns of risk aversion is wrong; modeling risk aversion with probability transformations also 
can produce implausible implications from calibration.   
 Empirical research leading to conclusions that estimated parametric forms of utility 
functionals can represent subjects’ behavior in risky decision making can be checked for 
plausibility by applying research methods explained here. Two types of questions can be posed. 
First, does the estimated parametric form survive testing with St. Petersburg lotteries that can be 
derived from the parametric form using methods explained above? Second, does the estimated 
parametric form of a utility functional survive experimental testing with binary lottery designs 
that can be derived from the parametric form using methods explained above? If the answer to 
either question is “no” then the conclusion that the estimated utility functional can rationalize risk 
taking behavior is called into question.  
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APPENDIX 
 
A.1. Lemma Let functions :[0,1] [0,1],h →  s.t. ( , ) 0 0,nn nh p P for all p
−
∞ ≠ ≠  and 
: ,ϕ ℜ→ℜ  be given. If ϕ  is unbounded from above then 
(a)  for all ,n N∈  there exists nx N∈  such that ( ) 1 / (1 / 2 , (1 / 2 ) )
n n
nx hϕ
−
∞≥ , and 
(b)  (1 / 2 , (1 / 2 ) ) ( )n n n
n
h xϕ−∞
∈
= ∞∑  
Proof. (a) It follows from (1 / 2 , (1 / 2 ) ) 0,n nh −∞ ≠  for all ,n N∈  and by definition of a function 
being unbounded from above.   
(b) Part (a) and (1 / 2 , (1 / 2 ) ) 0n nh −∞ >  implies ( ) (1 / 2 , (1 / 2 ) ) 1
n n
nx hϕ
−
∞× ≥ , hence (b) is 
true. 
 
A.2. Corollary: An Affordable Version of the Generalized St. Petersburg game  
Let an agent’s preferences, ,hϕ  on lottery space be represented by functional (6) with an 
unbounded money transformation function ϕ  and probability transformation function h. 
Define 1, { | , sup{ (1 / (1 / 2 , (1 / 2 ) ))}}
n n
h n nX x n N x hϕ ϕ
− −
∞= ∈ ≥ . For any given N,  
1
,( 1) { ,1 / 2 }h NN xϕϕ
−
∞ ∞+  
 where { ,1 / 2 }Nx∞ ∞  is a St. Petersburg game that pays ,n hx Xϕ∈  when a fair coin comes up 
heads for the first time on flip n , for n < N and  Nx  otherwise. 
Proof.  Note that  
1
1..
({ ,1 / 2 } ) (1 / 2 , (1 / 2 ) ) ( ) ( ) (1 / 2 , (1 / 2 ) )) 1n n n nN n N
n N n N
U x h x x h Nϕ ϕ− −∞ ∞ ∞ + ∞
= >
= + = +∑ ∑  
 
A.3. Implausible Risk Aversion of type (I*) 
Let an agent’s preferences on lottery space be represented by represented by a theory D with 
functional (6) with a bounded money transformation function. For any given x there exists a L  
such that { ,0.5; }Dx L x+ ∞ . 
Proof.  Let ϕ  be the money transformation function and g(0.5) be the transformed probability of 
0.5 under decision theory D.  Function ϕ  is bounded from above and positively monotonic, so:  
there exists and A such that (i) sup { ( )},xA xϕ=  and (ii) lim ( )x x Aϕ→∞ = . For any given x, take 
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( ( ))(1 (0.5)) 0A x gε ϕ= − − >  and apply (ii) to find a zx s.t. ( )xz Aϕ ε> − . To complete the 
proof take xL z x= − , substitute the expression of ε  in the last inequality and verify that  
( ) (0.5) ( )(1 (0.5))x L Ag x gϕ ϕ+ > + − .  
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Table 1.  Payments in Finite St. Petersburg Lotteriesa 
 
EV: 2nnx = ,  [2,4,8,16,32,64,128,256,512],  (EV=10) 
Power Function EU DU CP and RD ( ( )x xαϕ = ) 
R 1/(1 )((1 )2 )n rnx r
−= −  1/ (2 )nn Dx h
−=  α  γ  nx  
0.1 
 
 
L= [2,5,9,20,42,91,196,422] 
(CE(L)=10.56; EV(L) =12.19) 
(f(p)=p/(2-p)) 
 
L= [2,6,14,30,62,126,254,510] 
(CE(L)=9.6; EV(L) =16) 
0.88d 0.62d
 
 
      L= [2,10,17,24,35,50,75,115,180,284,454]
(CE(L)= 18.50;  EV(L) =11.11) 
 
0.5 
 
 
L= [1,4,16,64,256]  
(CE(L)=9; EV(L) =23.5) 
(f(p)=p2)   
 
L= [2,6,22,86,342]  
 (CE(L)=6; EV = 32) 
0.5e 0.71e 
 
L=  [4,36,96,220,503] 
(CE(L)=46.88; EV(L) = 68.19) 
 
0.67 L = [1,3,19,155]  (CE(L)= 6.45; EV(L) =23)  0.37
b 0.56f L=  [4,391] (CE(L)= 61.62;  EV(L)=197.5) 
0.56c L= [1,4,18,85,408]  (CE(L)=9.78; EV =34.56)     
a  A prize vector of length k means the lottery pays the n-th coordinate when head appears for the first time on flip n for n<k, and kx  otherwise.   
b  The estimate of alpha is the estimate of Wu and Gonzalez (p.1686) using Camerer and Ho (1994) data. 
c  (field data) Campo et al. (2000). 
d  Tversky and Kahneman (1992).  
e  Wu and Gonzalez (1996). 
 f  Camerer and Ho (1994). 
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Table 2.  Predictions for Binary Lotteries Using Parameter Point Estimates from Small Stakes Data 
 
 
Holt and Laury (2005) 
 
 
           
Hey and Orme (1994) 
 
 
          
Harrison and Rutström (2008) 
replication of   
Hey and Orme (1994) 
        
 CRRA EP CRRA EP CRRA EP 
Binary 
Lotteriesa 
EU 
r =0.76 
RD 
ρ =0.85 
γ =1.46b
EU 
r =0.4 
α =0.07
RD 
ρ =0.26 
α =0.02b
γ =0.37 
EU 
r =0.61
RD 
ρ =0.61
γ =0.99 
EU 
r =0.82
α = 
-1.06 
 
RD 
r =0.82 
α = 
-1.06 
γ =0.99
 
EU 
r =0.53
RD 
ρ =0.53
γ =0.97 
EU 
r =0.78
α = 
-1.10 
 
RD 
r =0.78 
α = 
-1.10 
γ =0.97 
 
{77,0.5;0}≺  4.3 0.4 15.8 8.6         
{30,0.5;0}≺  1.7 0.2 7.5 3.4 5.1 5.1 4.6 4.6     
{14,0.5;0}≺  0.78 0.08 3.81 1.9 2.4 2.4 1.81 1.81 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.1 
a  The higher payoff in a binary lottery is within the range of payoffs used in the experiment.  Numbers are in U.S. dollars for 
 the Holt-Laury and Harrison-Rutström studies and in British ponds for the Hey-Orme study in the middle columns. 
b  p-values are larger than 0.1 
 
 
